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that German immigrants made for
highly respected soldiers in the American Civil War. He also misses the First
and Second Schleswig-Holstein Wars of
1848–51 and 1864, respectively, when
he asserts that in 1866 Prussia had not
been at war for nearly fifty years.
Despite these significant shortcomings, this reviewer hopes that Muth
continues to contribute to both the
conversation and the controversy.
PETER J. SCHIFFERLE

Philbin, Tobias R. Battle of Dogger Bank: The First
Dreadnought Engagement. Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 2014. 198pp. $32

This title is the latest work from American naval historian Tobias Philbin, who
is probably best known for his 1982
biography of Admiral von Hipper. In the
author’s words, the book is “designed to
provide new insights into the first battle
between the largest fighting machines
of the early twentieth century.” As such,
one might expect that a detailed analysis
of the conduct of the battle itself would
form the heart of the work, with perhaps
a supporting explanation of the tactics
employed on both sides and a discussion of whether these were or were not
in line with prewar expectations. This
could have been further supported by
brief chapters explaining the strategic
situation in the naval war at that point;
the role of the key personalities; and the
original thinking behind the development of the “fast Dreadnought cruiser”
as a warship type, insofar as it might
help explain the platform’s performance
in the battle itself. The work could then
have been concluded with a discussion
on the lessons learned and whether the
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proposed corrective measures were successful. In other words, the focus should
have been clearly on the engagement
itself and what it vindicated or didn’t.
Sadly, however, and despite good intentions, Philbin falls well short of this aim.
His coverage of the actual battle is scanty
and disjointed, and the remainder of
the work is notably deficient or simply
inaccurate. This is doubly frustrating
given that this battle, the first of only
two dreadnought-versus-dreadnought
engagements in the entire war, probably
represented each side’s “last, best chance”
to put things right, so to speak, before
the better-known battle of Jutland a year
later. As such, it is indeed an important
area for study by the naval historian.
Philbin’s difficulties are threefold. First,
and as intimated, the balance is arguably
wrong between the coverage of the battle
itself and the supporting text. He devotes
only 30 of the 150 or so pages to actual
analysis of the battle, with the remaining
pages dealing with the supporting areas.
Unfortunately, these 30 pages, more than
many others, fall victim to the second
difficulty he has, which is in developing
a clear and coherent narrative of a series
of events, free from repetition and diversion. Rather than recounting the main
features of the engagement in a chronological fashion, he chooses to take the
different perspectives of the individual
ships involved, which does not help the
reader elucidate the decision making as
it might have appeared to the opposing fleet commanders at the time—a
feature central to his stated aim—and
leads to a nonsequential presentation of
the main events. None of this is helped
by the maps in the book that, although
reproductions of the original battle
reports and histories, are almost unreadable in the scale presented. Thus, despite
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being fairly familiar with the overall
engagement, I found myself resorting to Wikipedia for a quick reminder
and sanity check. Repetition is also rife
throughout the book, sometimes in
successive paragraphs, pages, and even
endnotes, which makes the reader’s
journey more laborious than it need be.
The real worry, though, is his third
difficulty: that of accuracy and the
incorporation of a comprehensive coverage of the relevant scholarship. On the
accuracy side, some of the construction
dates for the ships involved are incorrect, even according to the sources that
he does use; he cites the wrong Lambert
in the text on page 6; on page 24, he
claims Dogger was the first “battle” in
the Anglo-German naval race when it
was, of course, the first dreadnought
engagement; while on page 27 he has
HMS Vernon as “the gunnery school for
the Royal Navy,” when it was actually
HMS Excellent. To make matters worse
in the context, Admiral John “Jacky”
Fisher was of course closely associated
with both of these establishments, albeit
at different points in his career. In addition, and while not as specific, there are
all sorts of other, more general omissions and inaccuracies in the presentation of the powder vulnerabilities, the
ammunition and gunnery practices in
use, and the train of thought that led to
the all-big-gun ordnance, all of which
could have been corrected by reference
to some of the more current scholarship from the likes of Jon Sumida, John
Brooks, and Norman Friedman. Perhaps
most importantly, though, and given
that the author attempted to cover the
origins of the battle cruiser type in his
second chapter, it was disappointing to
find Admiral Fisher’s role in the whole
debate minimized, and the relationship
between the true dreadnought and its
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battle cruiser variant simplified to an
unrealistic degree. This is no trivial matter, because, to a greater or lesser extent,
the fact that the battle cruiser was essentially performing in a role that had not
been originally envisioned by its creators
goes a long way toward explaining the
very mixed results these ships achieved.
Once again, this could have been better
represented with a more searching inclusion of some of the more cutting-edge
findings from Sumida, Nicolas Lambert, Matthew Seligmann, and others.
In sum, this book will probably disappoint the serious historian of the
period. It does gather together in one
place a host of interesting and related
facts about the battle and its participants. Given that these can form
useful “points of departure” for future
work in this area, as well as informing and inspiring the amateur naval
enthusiast, all is not lost. But the book
could have been so much more.
ANGUS ROSS

Huang, Chun-chieh. Taiwan in Transformation:
Retrospect and Prospect. 2nd ed. New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction, 2014. 233pp. $52.95

As a native Taiwanese deeply steeped
in Chinese historical and philosophical
sources, Chun-chieh Huang adds dimensions that are less emphasized in many
other perceptive books on contemporary
Taiwan. A prolific scholar of treatises on
Confucian thought, Huang believes that
Taiwan can bring much to contemporary Confucian thinking, since Taiwan
interprets the world through a lens of
contemporary and vibrant democracy—
as opposed to China’s legacy of the
Cultural Revolution and party control.
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